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Taking analogy as both its mode and object of inquiry, this article 
examines the relationship between historical-geographical analogies 
and generational segregation (the large-scale separation of children 
and adults) from three complementary perspectives.  
First, due to restrictions recently introduced by the Israeli 
authorities, Palestinian prisoners have been prevented from reading 
popular study materials dealing with both Indigenous child removal 
and analogies concerning settler-Indigenous relations in North America 
and Australia. This article revives the critical potential of this encounter 
with analogies and accounts, by putting forward an analogy between 
the removal of Indigenous children to boarding schools in the United 
States and Canada, Australia’s Aboriginal “stolen generations,” and the 
increased separation of Palestinian children and adults in Israeli 
custody. This analogy highlights key parallels: the deleterious effects of 
allegedly benevolent generational segregation; the invocation of law 
and children’s “best interests;” the severance of unwanted 
intergenerational influences; the targeting of children due to their 
presumed plasticity; the use of separation to govern adults; and links 
between generational segregation, “national security,” and 
incarceration.  
Second, these analogies—those that Palestinians explored in Israeli 
prison and the generational segregation analogy developed here—
partly overlap with, and acquire their potential and implications from 
other analogies, concerning settler-Indigenous relations in North 
America, Australia, and Israel/Palestine. This article investigates the 
roles such analogies have played, and their alignment with competing 
ideologies, across a range of legal and political discourses over the past 
two centuries.  
Finally, in order to maximize the critical potential of such historical-
geographical analogies, this article offers a conceptual critique of three 
relevant discourses: legalistic analogies concerning generational 
segregation, which leave unchallenged the broader field of child law 
and policy on which such segregation hinges; rigid conceptualizations 
of (settler) colonialism in debates on analogies between North America, 
Australia, and Israel/Palestine; and the tendency to reduce analogy to 
similarity.  
Bringing into conversation previously separate bodies of 
scholarship, these three interdependent perspectives shed new light on 
important yet hitherto unexamined issues at the intersection of analogy 
and generational segregation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the last quarter of the 19th century, . . . [the U.S.] govern-
ment reached the conclusion that successful assimilation re-
quired removing Indian children from their reservations and 
reeducating them away from their families and environments. 
. . . For several years, Indian parents had to send their children 
to various off-reservation boarding schools . . . or to specially 
constructed boarding schools at the periphery of the reserva-
tions. . . . Once the children arrived at these schools, their 
teachers would force them to abandon their tribal customs and 
adopt white-American behaviors . . . . Many children’s experi-
ence of the boarding school was traumatic . . . [and the] integ-
rity of the Indian family—whose children had been removed—
was severely compromised. 
The forced removal of [Aboriginal] children from their families 
as part of their reeducation continued [in Australia] . . . even 
during the 20th century. . . . The Australian government’s apol-
ogy for these actions—even after the findings of an inquiry 
commission it itself had appointed in the 1990s—was weak and 
insufficient. . . .1 
Taken from a textbook of the Israeli Open University on the 
genocide2 of North America’s Indigenous peoples, these excerpts 
seem to lend themselves to analogy. Indeed, as described in this 
article, this academic book systematically encourages its readers 
to think critically through analogies between different times and 
places.3 As the book title broadly refers to “North America,” such 
analogy may encompass Canada, where a somewhat similar pol-
icy was pursued for over a century by placing an estimated 
                                                                                                             
 1. ARNON GUTFELD, GENOCIDE IN THE “LAND OF THE FREE”: THE INDIANS OF 
NORTH AMERICA 1776–1890, at 19, 145–47 (Geremy Forman trans., 2006). 
 2. The U.N. Genocide Convention lists “forcibly transferring children of the 
group to another group” as a genocidal act if “committed with intent to destroy, 
in whole or part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.” G.A. Res. 260 
(III) A, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide (Dec. 9, 1948). This is mentioned in the above Open University textbook. 
See GUTFELD, supra note 1, at 13. For an extensive discussion of this definition 
of genocide, see GENOCIDE AND SETTLER SOCIETY: FRONTIER VIOLENCE AND 
STOLEN INDIGENOUS CHILDREN IN AUSTRALIAN HISTORY (A. Dirk Moses ed., 
2004). 
 3. See infra text accompanying notes 8–12. 
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150,000 Indigenous children in so-called Indian Residential 
Schools.4 
In the last two decades, both Canada and Australia have seen 
the publication of public inquiry reports on, and prime ministe-
rial apologies for, the generational segregation5 of their respec-
tive Indigenous peoples. There has also been litigation on the 
matter in both countries. This included a settlement agreement 
in Canada’s largest ever class action lawsuit on behalf of living 
residential school survivors, in 2006, which led to a national 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission operating from 2008 
through 2015.6 In the United States, then-President Obama 
signed the Native American Apology Resolution into law in 
2009, but the event was closed to the public, and the laconic res-
olution, unlike the bill, made no mention of child removal.7 
                                                                                                             
 4. See WARD CHURCHILL, KILL THE INDIAN, SAVE THE MAN: THE GENOCIDAL 
IMPACT OF AMERICAN INDIAN RESIDENTIAL SCHOOLS (2004); JAMES R. MILLER, 
SHINGWAUK’S VISION: A HISTORY OF NATIVE RESIDENTIAL SCHOOLS (1996); JOHN 
S. MILLOY, A NATIONAL CRIME: THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE 
RESIDENTIAL SCHOOL SYSTEM, 1879 TO 1986 (1999). 
 5. On the reasons for using the phrase “generational segregation,” see infra 
text accompanying notes 171–72. 
 6. For critiques of these developments, see RECONCILING CANADA: CRITICAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE CULTURE OF REDRESS (Jennifer Henderson & Pauline 
Wakeham eds., 2013); Leslie Thielen-Wilson, White Terror, Canada’s Indian 
Residential Schools and the Colonial Present: From Law Towards a Pedagogy 
of Recognition (2012) (Ph.D. thesis, University of Toronto), https://tspace.li-
brary.utoronto.ca/handle/1807/32328; Tony Barta, Sorry, and Not Sorry, in 
Australia: How the Apology to the Stolen Generations Buried a History of Gen-
ocide, 10 J. GENOCIDE RES. 201 (2008); Denise Cuthbert & Marian Quartly, 
Forced Child Removal and the Politics of National Apologies in Australia, 37 
AM. INDIAN Q. 178 (2013); Cindy Holder, Reasoning Like a State: Integration 
and the Limits of Official Regret, in ON THE USES AND ABUSES OF POLITICAL 
APOLOGIES 203 (Mihaela Mihai & Mathias Thaler eds., 2014); Damien Short, 
When Sorry Isn’t Good Enough: Official Remembrance and Reconciliation in 
Australia, 5 MEMORY STUD. 293 (2012); Leslie Thielen-Wilson, Troubling the 
Path to Decolonization: Indian Residential School Case Law, Genocide, and 
Settler Legitimacy, 29 CAN. J.L. & SOC. 181 (2014); Pauline Wakeham, Recon-
ciling “Terror”: Managing Indigenous Resistance in the Age of Apology, 36 AM. 
INDIAN Q. 1 (2012). On the politics of official apologies for historical mass child 
abuse in out-of-home care generally, beyond the Indigenous child removal con-
text, see APOLOGIES AND THE LEGACY OF ABUSE OF CHILDREN IN ‘CARE’: 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (Johanna Sköld & Shurlee Swain eds., 2015). 
 7. On these and other shortcomings, see Kevin Bruyeel, The American Lib-
eral Colonial Tradition, 3 SETTLER COLONIAL STUD. 311 (2013); Penny Ed-
monds, Afterword: On Recognition, Apology and the ‘Hidden History of the 
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As shown in Part I of this article, the above textbook and the 
two subjects it addresses—generational segregation and analo-
gies—have played a key role for Palestinians in Israeli prison. 
Until recently, this textbook was immensely popular among im-
prisoned Palestinians, many of whom were enrolled in courses 
provided by the Israeli Open University. Through this and other 
study materials, they engaged with potentially critical histori-
cal-geographical analogies, allowing them to ideationally trav-
erse the prison walls. Further, not only could these Palestinians 
read about faraway generational segregation in this academic 
book, but they themselves have also been increasingly subjected 
to such segregation in Israeli prison as a result of changes to the 
laws applied to them. Moreover, the Israeli government recently 
banned their enrollment in such academic courses, thus denying 
them access to this book—with its analysis of generational seg-
regation and its analogy-oriented critique. 
Placing analogies, generational segregation, and their interre-
lation at its core, this article poses three questions. Part I of the 
article will address the first question: what critical insights can 
historical-geographical analogies offer, particularly regarding 
generational segregation? As if reviving Palestinian prisoners’ 
encounter with analogy-filled studies, the article will advance an 
analogy between the removal of Indigenous children to boarding 
schools in the United States and Canada, Australia’s Aboriginal 
“stolen generations,” and the separation of Palestinian children 
and adults in Israeli custody. Through this analogy, important, 
but hitherto overlooked, parallels will be brought to light: the 
deleterious effects of allegedly benevolent generational segrega-
tion; the invocation of law and children’s “best interests;” the 
severance of unwanted intergenerational influences; the target-
ing of children due to their presumed plasticity; the use of sepa-
ration to govern adults; and links between generational segrega-
tion, “national security,” and incarceration. 
Having employed analogy as its mode of inquiry, the article 
will turn, in Part II, to using analogy as an object of inquiry. In 
so doing, the article will critically reflect, in a sense, on its own 
method. The article will thus tackle a second question, concern-
ing analogy’s discursive functions: what role have analogies—
                                                                                                             
Americas,’ 1 SETTLER COLONIAL STUD. 182 (2011); Felicia S. Hodge, No Mean-
ingful Apology for American Indian Unethical Research Abuses, 22 ETHICS & 
BEHAV. 431 (2012). 
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particularly those involving settler-Indigenous dynamics (as in 
the above textbook)—played in legal and political discourses sur-
rounding North America, Israel/Palestine, and Australia? To ad-
dress this issue, Part II will analyze a two-century long tapestry 
of analogies between these countries, discussing the various and 
often competing narratives and ideologies with which such anal-
ogies have aligned themselves. Among other things, this analy-
sis will provide context to better understand Palestinian prison-
ers’ engagement with analogy-filled studies, as well as Israeli 
authorities’ crackdown on these studies. 
Further inquiring into analogy, and in view of the multiple 
uses of analogies identified in this article, Part III will consider 
a third and final question: what are the possible pitfalls of anal-
ogies, including the analogies Palestinian prisoners studied and 
the analogy this article explores in relation to generational seg-
regation in North America, Australia, and Israel/Palestine? 
How, while opening up certain horizons for thought, do analogies 
exclude or obscure others? In addressing this question, Part III 
will focus on three germane framings of analogies. The first is 
legalistic analogies, which portray the generational segregations 
in question as violations of, or deviations from, legal norms. This 
framing, the article will show, ignores crucial connections and 
parallels these supposedly exceptional segregations share with 
the broader field of child law and policy. A second problematic 
framing—often appearing in debates on analogies between 
North America, Australia, and Israel/Palestine—is rigid concep-
tualizations or demarcations of (settler) colonialism. This rigid-
ity, the article will argue, represents over-simplistic and reduc-
tive understandings of (settler) colonialism. Finally, the third 
framing of analogies is the common tendency to reduce them to 
similarity. As the article will explain, this conception overlooks 
analogy’s predication on difference, ignores analogy’s influence 
on whether its supposedly preexisting referents are deemed 
alike in the first place, and risks making similarity a prerequi-
site for solidarity. 
The Conclusion will bring together these three complementary 
readings. It will discuss their innovative linking of heretofore 
separate bodies of scholarship, the holistic perspective this ap-
proach provides, and the unique implications for thinking about 
both analogy and generational segregation. As will be explained, 
methodologically, this holistic approach employs analogy both as 
a mode and an object of inquiry. In so doing, it highlights the 
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need for self-reflexivity about one’s method and about the insep-
arability of methods (such as analogy) from their field of analy-
sis. Substantively, this perspective brings to center stage the po-
litical potential common to critical analogies and intergenera-
tional knowledge transfer, and helps think critically about the 
role both analogy and generational segregation play in the social 
construction of childhood. 
I. ANALOGY AND GENERATIONAL SEGREGATION 
This Part of the article will open with a critical analysis of Is-
raeli authorities’ clampdown on two practices that carried the 
potential for imprisoned Palestinians to ideationally transcend 
their confinement. The first is Palestinian prisoners’ engage-
ment—through studies now banned by the Israeli government 
and courts—with historical-geographical analogies and the issue 
of Indigenous child removal in North America and Australia. 
The second practice is the transfer of political knowledge from 
one generation of Palestinian inmates to another, an activity 
that has faded away following the growing separation of Pales-
tinian children from their adult counterparts in Israeli custody. 
Akin to reviving Palestinian prisoners’ encounter with critical 
analogies and texts, this Part will put forward an analogy be-
tween generational segregation in four contexts: the removal of 
Indigenous children to boarding schools in the United States and 
Canada, Australia’s Aboriginal “stolen generations,” and the 
separation of Palestinian children and adults in Israeli custody. 
This generational segregation analogy will bring to the fore pre-
viously unexamined parallels and connections, including as re-
gards the justifications given for generational segregation, its 
detrimental impact on the segregated populations, and the 
broader sociopolitical context. Alongside cross-national links 
generational segregation involved at the time and its lasting leg-
acies in North America and Australia, this analogy will demon-
strate its contemporary reemergence in the form of analogous 
practices in Israel/Palestine. 
A. Transcending Prison Through Analogies 
The Israeli academic book repeatedly fosters critical thinking 
through analogies (albeit without explicitly using the term 
“analogy”). It analogizes “the current approach of the United 
States toward its Indigenous population” to those of “other states 
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. . . [including] Canada . . . [and] Australia”8 and also encourages 
students to consider lessons from (and thus think through anal-
ogies about) U.S. history.9 The textbook further counts the 
United States—which it calls a “settler state”10—among the cul-
prits for “‘colonial’ genocides” by “European settlers . . . [in] the 
Americas and Australia,” settlers who are said to have “sup-
planted, and directly or indirectly exterminated, America’s In-
digenous people . . . [and] Australia’s Aborigines.”11 The term 
“colonial” reappears in another Open University book,12 this 
time in reference to Israel’s treatment of Palestinians, perhaps 
insinuating a cross-national commonality. 
Until recently, among the readers of these analogy-invoking 
textbooks were many of the Palestinians in Israeli custody whom 
Israeli authorities classify as “security prisoners”—an elastic 
statutory category applied almost exclusively to Palestinians, 
predominantly noncitizens.13 From 1994, such prisoners could 
enroll in Israeli Open University courses in the social sciences 
and humanities, subject to the prison authorities’ discretion.14 
With an average of around 250 security prisoners enrolled each 
year, mostly under the Palestinian Authority’s sponsorship, 
these academic courses became hugely popular.15 Most popular 
                                                                                                             
 8. GUTFELD, supra note 1, at 21. 
 9. See id. at 8–9.  
 10. Id. at 24. 
 11. Id. at 19–20. 
 12. See Amal Jamal, Racialized Time and the Foundations of Colonial Rule 
in the Israeli-Palestinian Context, in GENOCIDE: BETWEEN RACISM AND 
GENOCIDE IN THE MODERN ERA 185 (Yair Auron & Isaac Lubelsky eds., 2011), 
http://olvreader.sefereshet.org.il/Ol-
ive/OTB/OpenU/?href=OU03/2008/01/11&usticket=Z3Vlc3Q&ticket=. 
 13. Rima Ayoub, Statistics on Detainees and Prisoners in Israeli Prisons, 
ADALAH (2013), http://www.adalah.org/Public/files/English/Newsletter/103-
April2013/PalestianPoliticalPrisoners-Statistics-April-2013.pdf. 
 14. This provision, made after a hunger strike by some Palestinian prison-
ers in 1992, was granted in Commission Ordinance 04.48.00: Security Prison-
ers’ Open University Studies (Jan. 8, 2004, repealed June 2011) (Isr.); it was 
repealed in 2011. In contrast, non-security prisoners have been allowed to 
study since as early as 1978. See Petition in HCJ 204/13 Salah v. Israel Prison 
Serv. (2013) (Isr.) [hereinafter Petition in HCJ 204/13], 
http://www.acri.org.il/he/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/hit204.pdf. 
 15. See Petition in HCJ 204/13; YANIV RONEN, KNESSET RESEARCH & INFO. 
CENT., SECURITY PRISONERS’ ACADEMIC STUDIES (Nov. 28, 2013) (Hebrew), 
http://www.knesset.gov.il/mmm/data/pdf/m03319.pdf. 
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was a course on the topic of genocide,16 which includes the fore-
going textbooks.17 As one of the course lecturers would later re-
count, “the Palestinian prisoners are particularly interested in 
[studying] . . . the annihilation of the Native Americans.”18 
In 2011, however, the Israeli government announced a prohi-
bition on these prisoners’ enrollment in Open University 
courses19—a decision that since has been upheld twice by the Is-
raeli supreme court.20 Being most popular among Palestinian 
prisoners, the course on genocide, filled with potentially loaded 
analogies, figured prominently in the ensuing legal and political 
debate. In his response to Palestinian prisoners’ petitions to lift 
                                                                                                             
 16. See Eric Bender, The Most Popular Course Among Terrorists: Genocide, 
NRG (Dec. 5, 2013) (Hebrew), 
http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART2/528/384.html. 
 17. For excerpts from these textbooks that deal with Indigenous child re-
moval in the United States and Australia, see supra text accompanying note 
1. 
 18. Yehonatan Alsheh, Teaching Comparative Genocide Studies to Palestin-
ian Prisoners in Israel, GENOCIDE TALK (July 8, 2011), http://geno-
cidetalk.wordpress.com/2011/07/08/teaching-comparative-genocide-studies-to-
palestinian-prisoners-in-israel/. 
 19. Though the Israeli government presented the ban, in 2011, as a means 
to pressure the Palestinian Hamas into releasing Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit 
from captivity in Gaza, the Israeli prison authorities had already barred “se-
curity prisoners” from taking around thirty Open University courses four years 
before Shalit’s capture; access to these courses was resumed, at the time, only 
following the Palestinian prisoners’ petition on the matter. Petition (Nazareth) 
761/02 John Doe v. Israel Prison Serv. (2002) (Isr.), 
http://www.acri.org.il/pdf/petitions/hit761.pdf; see also Security Prisoners 
Barred from Taking Certain Courses, ASS’N C.R. ISR. (Nov. 7, 2002) (Hebrew), 
http://www.acri.org.il/he/529. Additionally, the prison authorities had already 
introduced the blanket ban on Open University studies in 2010, a year before 
the government publicly announced it and linked it to Shalit’s release. See Avi 
Issacharoff & Amos Harel, Palestinian Prisoners: Netanyahu’s Crackdown is 
Old News, HAARETZ (June 28, 2011), http://www.haaretz.com/print-edi-
tion/news/palestinian-prisoners-netanyahu-s-crackdown-is-old-news-
1.369940. Despite Shalit’s release in exchange for Palestinian prisoners in 
2011, the prohibition on Open University studies remains in place. See, e.g., 
Joshua Mitnick, Behind Bars, a Famed Palestinian Leads His People in a 
Prison Hunger Strike, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2017), 
http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-israel-palestinian-hunger-
strike-20170418-story.html. 
 20. See CA 2459/12 Salah v. Israel Prison Serv. (2012) (Isr.), 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/12/590/024/s07/12024590.s07.pdf; HCJ (further 
hearing) 204/13 Salah v. Israel Prison Serv. (2015) (Isr.), 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/13/040/002/c25/13002040.c25.pdf. 
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the ban, the Israeli state attorney conflated learning about gen-
ocide with genocidal inclinations, by pointing to the popularity 
of this course as evidence, supposedly, of the prisoners’ fanati-
cism.21 Protesting against these “unseemly and outrageous” al-
legations, the president of the Open University remarked that 
the course actually “conveys a universal and moral message” and 
aims to “give students knowledge about the issue of genocide and 
the ability to analyze it as a historical phenomenon.”22 Yet, this 
criticism did not prevent the chair of the Israeli parliamentary 
Interior and Environmental Affairs Committee, who would later 
become a minister, from making similar claims: 
The . . . prisoners’ main studies are genocide studies—this is 
unbelievable. . . . [T]hey learn how to continue acting against 
the State of Israel. . . . The mentality of a prisoner studying 
genocide is clear. . . . [They] studied genocide . . . in order to 
perfect their ideas and capabilities toward their possible re-
lease from prison . . . . If they wish to rehabilitate themselves, 
they should study something else, not genocide.23 
In fact, this academic course on genocide is not the only plat-
form Palestinian prisoners have cultivated for potentially criti-
cal historical-geographical analogies. Nor is it the only such plat-
form curtailed by the Israeli authorities. The prisoners’ self-or-
ganized study groups have reportedly placed emphasis on exam-
ining parallels and differences between military and colonial re-
gimes, as well as on studying the political experience of libera-
tion movements outside Israel/Palestine.24 The Israeli prison au-
thorities, on their part, have clamped down on this analogy-ori-
ented avenue as well, placing the prisoners’ study activities un-
der increasing restrictions.25 
                                                                                                             
 21. See Ofir Mintz-Manor, Genocide, Year 1, HAARETZ (Jan. 3, 2013) (He-
brew), http://www.haaretz.co.il/opinions/1.1899899. 
 22. Talila Nesher & Jackie Khoury, Open University Lecturers Versus the 
Supreme Court: Grant Studies to Security Prisoners, HAARETZ (Jan. 9, 2013) 
(Hebrew), http://www.haaretz.co.il/news/law/1.1903654. 
 23. Interior & Environmental Affairs Committee, 19th Knesset–Transcript 
160, at 2, 18–19 (Dec. 23, 2013) (Hebrew), http://www.knesset.gov.il/proto-
cols/data/rtf/pnim/2013-12-23.rtf. 
 24. See MAYA ROSENFELD, CONFRONTING THE OCCUPATION: WORK, 
EDUCATION, AND POLITICAL ACTIVISM OF PALESTINIAN FAMILIES IN A REFUGEE 
CAMP (2004); see also JOHN COLLINS, OCCUPIED BY MEMORY: THE INTIFADA 
GENERATION AND THE PALESTINIAN STATE OF EMERGENCY (2004). 
 25. See Commission Ordinance 03.02.00: Guidelines Regarding Security 
Prisoners art. 21 (Mar. 15, 2002, last amended July 10, 2014) (Isr.). 
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Without idealizing the emancipatory power of education, Pal-
estinians’ encounter with these analogies in Israeli prison seems 
to exemplify what anthropologist Esmail Nashif has described 
as these prisoners’ “revolutionary pedagogy”: their use of “read-
ing/writing [as a] . . . praxis of resistance . . . not just in and by 
itself but, more importantly, as part of the community-building 
process . . . as a space between captives that transcend[s] the 
space of the prisons.”26 The power of such textual engagements 
to ideationally traverse the prison’s confines becomes all the 
more pronounced when analogies such as the above are involved, 
analogies that further urge Palestinian prisoners to think across 
and in relation to times and places different from their own. By 
hindering Palestinian inmates’ ability to imagine past the prison 
walls, Israel’s repression of such studies and analogies operates 
as mental incarceration of sorts, and thus as an additional form 
of punishment, even if not formally presented as such. 
B. Generational Segregation in Israeli Custody 
In addition to losing access to the course textbook that 
broaches the subject of generational segregation in North Amer-
ica and Australia, Palestinians in Israeli custody have them-
selves recently experienced increased generational segregation. 
In the spirit of the analogy-filled study materials these prisoners 
are prevented from reading, the question arises of whether their 
generational segregation can, in any sense, be considered analo-
gous to that of Indigenous people in North America or Australia. 
In order to tackle this question, some background information is 
necessary. 
In the past, Israel held all Palestinian child prisoners, as well 
as child detainees aged sixteen and over, with Palestinian 
adults.27 This inadvertently enabled Palestinian inmates to sys-
tematically transfer what they regarded as valuable political 
knowledge from one generation to another, primarily through 
their self-organized study activities, leading many Palestinians 
to view Israeli prison as an academy of political activism for 
                                                                                                             
 26. ESMAIL NASHIF, PALESTINIAN POLITICAL PRISONERS: IDENTITY AND 
COMMUNITY 73–74 (2008). 
 27. Hedi Viterbo, Rights as a Divide-and-Rule Mechanism: Lessons from the 
Case of Palestinians in Israeli Custody, LAW & SOC. INQUIRY (forthcoming 
2018). 
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young inmates.28 Like the historical-geographical analogies with 
which they engaged, this intergenerational knowledge transfer 
held the potential for inmates to transcend their confinement—
the potential for ideationally reconnecting them with the Pales-
tinian society from which they had been removed, while also ty-
ing their past (their lives prior to prison) to the national future 
they were devising. None of this escaped the Israeli prison au-
thorities, who, in their journal, described prison as “the national 
Palestinian academy,” adding: “For [these] prisoners . . . [Israeli] 
prison is a stage in . . . national development, personally and 
collectively. . . . [They] have delved into Israeli issues, mainly by 
reading books . . . [and] have had ideological debates on . . . the 
future character of the Palestinian state.”29 
This intergenerational transfer of knowledge, however, has 
substantially declined, due to Israel’s growing separation of Pal-
estinian child inmates from their adult counterparts. Since the 
early 2000s—a period in which Israel is estimated to have de-
tained between 8,50030 and 12,00031 noncitizen Palestinian chil-
dren32—a series of legal changes have nearly eliminated joint in-
carceration.33 Further, in 2009, Israel established so-called “mil-
itary youth courts,” which try Palestinian children separately 
                                                                                                             
 28. ROSENFELD, supra note 24, at 238–65; COLLINS, supra note 24, at 125–
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BANK, INCLUDING EAST JERUSALEM (Oct. 2014), http://tbinter-
net.ohchr.org/Trea-
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 31. Imprisonment of Children, ADDAMEER (Feb. 2016), http://www.ad-
dameer.org/the_prisoners/children. 
 32. These figures do not include East Jerusalem, where nearly eight hun-
dred Palestinian children are estimated to have been detained in 2016. See 
Joint Report Estimates that 6440 Palestinians Arrested in 2016, ADDAMEER 
(Jan. 2, 2017), http://www.addameer.org/news/joint-report-estimates-6440-
palestinians-arrested-2016. 
 33. On these legal changes, see Viterbo, supra note 27. Joint incarceration 
remains legally permissible in certain circumstances. In addition, at their re-
quest, Palestinian prisoners are currently allowed to elect a few adults to over-
see child inmates during the day (while held separately at night). This limited 
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from their adult counterparts34 (though there has been no dis-
cernible change to either sentencing guidelines for these chil-
dren or the actual sentences imposed).35 In the early stages of 
this shift, the Israeli judiciary advocated separation as a means 
to sever intergenerational Palestinian influence.36 In 2003, for 
example, the military court of appeals cautioned against the ex-
posure of a twelve-year-old Palestinian convict “to . . . [older] 
prisoners’ ideologies” and therefore ordered his separation from 
those Palestinian “adults who wished to capture his soul,”37 an 
image strikingly reminiscent of nineteenth-century child rescue 
discourse. 
The increased generational segregation of Palestinians in Is-
raeli custody has recently been examined in depth elsewhere,38 
and this article will therefore only touch upon its most relevant 
implications. Crucially, the Palestinian adults in question are 
not “criminals” in the common sense of the word and are incar-
cerated separately from those who are classified as such. In-
stead, they often self-identify as “political prisoners.” Further, 
contrary to the Israeli courts’ remarks, various sources, includ-
ing testimonies of Palestinian child ex-detainees, suggest that 
when they were still jointly incarcerated, adult Palestinian in-
mates provided their juniors with valuable psychological, mate-
rial, and educational support, in addition to representing their 
concerns to the Israeli authorities. Moreover, separation from 
adult inmates has left Palestinian children less protected 
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ful consequences for Palestinian children: on the one hand, these adults pro-
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thorities have attempted to trick child suspects into confessing by detaining 
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infra text accompanying notes 236–37. 
 34. Israeli military courts try thousands of Palestinians from the West Bank 
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 35. See Viterbo, supra note 27. 
 36. See id. 
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Nasirat v. Military Prosecution (2003), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, 
in Hebrew) (Isr.). 
 38. See Viterbo, supra note 27. 
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against the abuse they frequently report suffering at the hands 
of the Israeli prison and security staff.39 
Formally, these Palestinian children are separated not from 
their parents but from the older inmates—a major difference, 
ostensibly, to Indigenous child removal in Australia and North 
America. In practice, however, many if not most of these Pales-
tinian children are also denied contact with their parents, usu-
ally on “security” grounds or as a result of being transferred to 
facilities inside Israel, and thus out of their families’ reach.40 
Like the growing restriction of Palestinians’ studies in Israeli 
prison, the frequent denial of parental contact operates as a form 
of psychological incarceration, and thus as extra punishment, 
even if not presented as such. For those children who are denied 
contact with their parents, adult Palestinian prisoners might be 
the closest available substitute for parental care.41 A child for-
merly detained with adults indeed intimated this: “The [adult] 
detainees treated us [children] well. . . . I felt comfortable. . . . At 
first, I was afraid and cried sometimes, because my family was 
far away. . . . The adult detainees took care of me.”42 
Following the growing generational segregation, the Israeli su-
preme court has relentlessly pressed for the prison authorities 
to exert counter-influence on Palestinian children in Israeli cus-
tody—or, in the court’s words, erect a “counter-barrier” of “reha-
bilitation,” “education and treatment.”43 No longer was it enough 
to terminate potentially politicizing practices, such as studies 
                                                                                                             
 39. See id.; see also Philip Veerman & Adir Waldman, When Can Children 
and Adolescents be Detained Separately from Adults?: The Case Of Palestinian 
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load/201107_no_minor_matter_eng.pdf; DEFENCE FOR CHILDREN 
INTERNATIONAL—PALESTINE, NO WAY TO TREAT A CHILD: PALESTINIAN CHILDREN 
IN THE ISRAELI MILITARY DETENTION SYSTEM (Apr. 2016), 
https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/dcipalestine/pages/1527/attach-
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 41. See DEFENCE FOR CHILDREN INTERNATIONAL—PALESTINE, supra note 40. 
 42. Testimony: 12-year-old Beaten and Imprisoned with Adults, Sept. ‘08, 
B’TSELEM (Sept. 11, 2008), http://www.btselem.org/english/testimo-
nies/20080911_muhammad_khawajah_age_12_detained_by_idf.asp. 
 43. CA 7515/08 State of Israel v. Gurin (2009) (Isr.) [hereinafter CA 7515/08], 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/08/150/075/t03/08075150.t03.pdf. 
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and intergenerational interactions in prison. Active depoliticiza-
tion, formulated as “rehabilitation” at Israeli hands, became the 
new frontier. Yet, from the standpoint of many Palestinians, 
children who violate Israeli military law, such as stone-throwers 
and demonstrators, are not juvenile delinquents in need of reha-
bilitation—all the more so when their so-called “rehabilitation” 
is placed in the hands of Israeli authorities, whose commitment 
to Palestinian interests is questionable. Further, in practice, 
most of the Israeli rulings extolling “rehabilitation” have neither 
avoided nor reduced Palestinian children’s prison sentences.44 
Unlike generational segregation, the judicial preoccupation with 
“rehabilitation” has yet to be translated into substantial changes 
in actual incarceration or trial arrangements—a matter the Is-
raeli supreme court has censured on several occasions.45 
C. Analogizing Generational Segregation 
As described thus far, while undergoing growing generational 
segregation, Palestinian prisoners have also been denied access 
to the study materials that deal with Indigenous child removal 
and historical-geographical analogies. A “what if” question thus 
arises: what if these Palestinians could continue encountering 
these analogies and information? Specifically, what insights and 
parallels could such analogies offer in relation to generational 
segregation, given the treatment of this issue in the Open Uni-
versity course book? 
A possible starting point for exploring such parallels is the det-
rimental effects of generational segregation. These include, 
among other things, exposing the separated children to either 
adult or peer abuse. Rather than separating children from 
adults outright, generational segregation has resulted in their 
placement with potentially abusive adults: be they Israeli state 
agents46 or, in North America and Australia, boarding school 
staff.47 In addition, in North America and Australia alike, while 
                                                                                                             
 44. See Viterbo, supra note 27. 
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 47. See DAVID WALLACE ADAMS, EDUCATION FOR EXTINCTION: AMERICAN 
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700 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 42:2 
generational segregation fostered a strong peer culture,48 it also 
exposed some Indigenous children to peer abuse in boarding 
schools.49 Interviews with former Palestinian child prisoners 
likewise suggest that Palestinian children might now be more 
likely to fight each other now because adult Palestinian inmates 
are not around to peacefully mediate their disputes.50 Moreover, 
because most Palestinian child inmates come from poor families 
in which children and adults sleep in the same room, separation 
from older prisoners may cause additional punishment for these 
children.51 This serves as a possible parallel to the relative age 
heterogeneity of Indigenous communities in North America and 
Australia prior to their generational segregation.52 None of this 
suggests, however, that the experience of generational segrega-
tion is inevitably or entirely negative for each and every child 
concerned. For instance, the boarding school systems had cer-
tain unintended consequences that some Indigenous children 
and communities have characterized as positive or empower-
ing.53 Yet, these positive effects, if they were indeed that, do not 
diminish the harms of generational segregation. 
Furthermore, across time and space, generational segregation 
has largely been couched in a language of legalism and benevo-
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lence. Israeli authorities have portrayed it as being both con-
sistent with international law and in Palestinian children’s “best 
interests.”54 Law, benevolence, rights, and humanism were sim-
ilarly invoked to advocate the displacement and reeducation of 
Indigenous children in North America and Australia, and statu-
tory authorities were developed and expanded to increasingly fa-
cilitate these measures.55 In the late nineteenth-century United 
States, placement in off-reservation boarding schools was por-
trayed as “rescuing . . . [Indigenous] children and youth . . . from 
the awful doom that hangs over them” and also as granting them 
“an opportunity for the development of . . . [their] better nature” 
by turning them into “honorable, useful, happy citizens of a great 
republic.”56 “Without it,” it was claimed, they were “doomed ei-
ther to destruction or to hopeless degradation.”57 Accordingly, 
legislation at the time spoke of the need to “ensure the attend-
ance of Indian children . . . at schools established . . . for their 
benefit.”58 Over several decades, beginning in the 1880s, Aus-
tralian officials likewise asserted that “half-caste” children 
“need protection and control, otherwise they become a menace to 
the white race.”59 Generational segregation was hence presented 
as rescuing Australia’s Indigenous children “from danger to 
themselves, and from being a danger to the whole of the white 
population” and also as a means of turning them into “decent 
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and useful members of the community,” whereas non-separation 
was described as, “to say the least . . ., cruel.”60 
In order to achieve these goals, a more specific common ra-
tionale, in varying iterations, has been that separation would 
sever allegedly harmful intergenerational ties. While presenting 
rehabilitation at Israeli hands as a means to enable Palestinian 
children “to function in accordance with norms and produc-
tively”—an alleged benefit to “the public interest”61—Israeli 
courts have also recurrently warned that intergenerational Pal-
estinian interactions in prison would undermine such rehabili-
tation.62 Child removal on both sides of the Pacific was likewise 
largely targeted against unwanted intergenerational knowledge 
transfer and aimed to break Indigenous children’s habits, 
thereby making them “useful” to white society.63 In the 1860s, 
U.S. officials voiced concerns over Indigenous adults’ “deleteri-
ous influences” over their youngsters, resulting in the “infection” 
of the latter with “the filthy habits and loose morals of their par-
ents.”64 A Canadian federal report likewise declared, in 1880: 
“The Indian youth, to enable him to cope successfully with . . . 
white [society] . . ., must be dissociated from the prejudicial in-
fluences by which he is surrounded.”65 Similarly, in the 1880s 
and 1890s, Canadian exponents of Indigenous child removal 
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cautioned against leaving Indigenous children “under the guard-
ianship of degraded parents,”66 who were seen as setting a “ter-
rible example” for their children and thereby destining them to 
become “as depraved as themselves notwithstanding all the in-
structions given them at a day school.”67 In a similar vein, in 
1937, one Australian state official claimed: “It is infinitely better 
to take a child from its mother, and put it in an institution . . . 
than to allow it to be brought up subject to the [Aboriginal] in-
fluence.”68 Neither reeducation nor separation alone was thus 
seen as sufficient. On the one hand, without rigid separation 
from their elders, exposure to intergenerational influence would 
have undermined the children’s reeducation. On the other hand, 
without reeducation, unwelcome habits and customs could not 
be properly replaced with knowledge acceptable to the dominant 
white culture.69 
Underpinning this rationale has been the targeting of children 
due to their presumed plasticity, being children, in contrast to 
the supposed irredeemability of their elders. The Israeli su-
preme court has emphatically espoused the “treatment of secu-
rity prisoners who are minors or young adults,”70 “whose reha-
bilitation chances are better” than those of their older counter-
parts.71 Further, the court recently remarked: “Where [‘security 
prisoners’ who are] minors are concerned, an educational effort 
is needed,” adding that even with a “young adult there may be 
room for hope.”72 In a rather analogous manner, as early as the 
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1820s and 1830s, Canadian administrators declared that Indig-
enous “[c]hildren—the rising Generation, hold out a field for ex-
ertion,”73 and that since “little perhaps can be expected from the 
grown up Indians, . . . [successful civilization] will chiefly depend 
upon . . . influence . . . over the young.”74 Later proponents of 
generational segregation for Canada’s Indigenous children con-
tinued placing their hopes in “the plastic young nature.”75 
These children, it was believed, needed to be “caught young to 
be saved from . . . the degenerating influence of their home envi-
ronment,”76 which meant that “it is to the young that we must 
look for the complete change of condition.”77 Indigenous adults, 
in contrast, were generally referred to as the “old unimprovable 
people” and deemed “physically, mentally and morally . . . unfit[] 
to bear such a complete metamorphosis.”78 In the late 1870s, a 
prominent Canadian official maintained that “[i]f anything is to 
be done with the Indian we must catch him very young,”79 add-
ing that U.S. authorities, too, “have not much hope in regard to 
adult Indians, but sanguine anticipations are cherished respect-
ing the children.”80 Officials in the United States opined that the 
“main hope lies with the youthful generations who are still 
measurably plastic,” whereas “little can be hoped from them af-
ter growth.” One official declared in 1879: “It is a mere waste of 
time to attempt to teach the average adult Indian the ways of 
the white man.” Another emphasized seven years later: “It is ra-
ther the little children that must be taken in hand.”81 South Aus-
tralia’s Protector of Aborigines argued in 1909, somewhat simi-
larly, that “the children of half-castes are as a rule much lighter 
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than their parents, and no doubt the process will continue until 
the blacks will altogether disappear.”82 
Though ostensibly child-focused, generational segregation tar-
gets adults as much as children. It aims to sever adults’ bonds 
with their future, a future embodied in the separated children, 
and consequently shatters the Indigenous or ethnic minority col-
lective. Additionally, it is concerned with the dominant group’s 
adults, for whom it endeavors to create a new future. And, be-
yond all of these functions, generational segregation has also 
served to govern adults no less than their separated juniors. For 
Israeli authorities, the presumed incorrigibility of the now-seg-
regated Palestinian adult inmates has furnished justification for 
eroding their rights, such as Open University studies. A core ar-
gument of Palestinian prisoners’ court petitions on the matter 
was that these studies aided their rehabilitation,83 a claim reit-
erated by Open University lecturers who joined the litigation as 
amicus curiae.84 One lecturer added elsewhere that the univer-
sity’s “comparative genocide studies” placed the Jewish Holo-
caust “within a comparative context and as part of the general 
phenomenon of genocide,” resulting in this historical event “no 
longer [being] dismissed by Palestinians as Zionist propa-
ganda.”85 The Israeli prison authorities, however, responded 
that these prisoners could not be meaningfully rehabilitated,86 
and the supreme court subsequently rejected the petitions.87 
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Since their increased separation, these adults have also been de-
nied other entitlements,88 including visits for precharge adult 
detainees and access to books from the outside.89 
With Indigenous adults in nineteenth-century North America, 
a key function of generational segregation was as a counterin-
surgency measure.90 During his tenure overseeing Indigenous 
war prisoners, Richard Henry Pratt—a key figure in the history 
of Indigenous child removal and reeducation—dealt with the 
adults’ requests to reunite with their children and women. It was 
then that he realized that generational segregation could serve 
to pacify Indigenous adults.91 At a time when education had al-
ready become an integral part of an aggressive policy of pacifi-
cation,92 others in the United States came to share Pratt’s view. 
One government official wrote to Pratt that “placing Indian chil-
dren in school” would make their “parents . . . much easier man-
aged . . . and never dare, or desire, to commit a serious wrong.” 
Another official specifically ordered Pratt to obtain children from 
two hostile reservations to be used as “hostages for tribal good 
behavior.”93 
Canadian prime minister John MacDonald’s interest in the 
possibility of reeducating Indigenous children, in the 1870s, was 
similarly inspired by his concern over Indigenous unrest.94 State 
officials and clergymen in Canada expressly spoke of residential 
schools as imperative tools for preventing Indigenous “rebellion” 
and enabling the peaceful occupation of the West. A key figure 
in Canada’s Department of Indian Affairs thus opined, in 1886: 
“It is unlikely that any Tribe or tribes would give trouble of a 
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serious nature to the Government whose members had children 
completely under Government control.”95 Similar arguments 
supporting child removal as a necessary means to break Indige-
nous resistance were also made in Australia in the 1850s and 
1860s.96 
While Israel classifies the separated Palestinian children as 
“security offenders,” the attempt to use generational segregation 
to break Indigenous insurgency and resistance in North America 
and Australia illustrates a broader common interrelation—by no 
means exclusive to Israel/Palestine—between generational seg-
regation, incarceration, and “national security.” The Open Uni-
versity course book that Palestinian prisoners are no longer al-
lowed to read aptly describes Pratt as a “military officer with 
great experience in fighting Indians.”97 Indeed, it was while ex-
perimenting in “rehabilitating” Indigenous prisoners of war 
through reeducation, work, and military discipline that Pratt, 
the war veteran, developed his ideas about reforming Indigenous 
children. Pratt’s fusion of the “battlefield and classroom”98 con-
tinued when he later established the first, highly influential, 
government-supported off-reservation boarding school for Indig-
enous children at an unused military base donated by the U.S. 
War Department.99 Following suit, a number of other schools 
were established in military barracks, and even schools not thus 
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placed were nevertheless patterned after military compounds.100 
There were initially dozens of children among the Indigenous 
prisoners, but most of them were eventually separated from the 
rest and placed in boarding schools. This was done even though 
the prison authorities recognized that such “separation . . . is 
what [these prisoners] . . . constantly dread.”101 
Due to their military-like drills and order, along with other 
reasons, many child inmates analogized boarding schools such 
as Pratt’s to prisons, an analogy reiterated by numerous writers 
at the time.102 Some Australian Indigenous children, too, de-
picted the institutions to which they were removed in similar 
terms.103 For Native American children, prison was more than a 
metaphor, since a standard form of punishment was to actually 
place them in a school “jail.”104 One U.S. state official also linked 
education, criminality, and armed conflict, differently, when 
warning in 1896 that Indigenous children, if left in their com-
munities, would “listen only to stories of war, rapine, [and] 
bloodshed” and consequently would become “a perpetual menace 
to our western civilization . . . that will . . . threaten [national] 
peace.”105 
Against this backdrop, it becomes clear that the two institu-
tional sites of generational segregation—incarceration (for Pal-
estinian “security prisoners”) and schools (for Indigenous people 
in North America and Australia)—have much in common.106 
Further, the continued hyperincarceration of Indigenous chil-
dren107 can be seen both as a legacy of Indigenous child removal 
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and as its continuation by other means. Formulating this obser-
vation as an analogy, one Canadian defense attorney has de-
scribed prison as “a ‘school’ for those [many Indigenous children] 
compelled to attend,” and criticized its “astonishing” parallels 
with so-called Indian Residential Schools—both being instru-
ments of mass removal, cultural assimilation through re-
strictions on Indigenous practices, and rampant abuse.108 
Indeed, a growing number of scholars have shown how the ex-
periences, effects, and policies of Indigenous child removal inter-
sect with and inform contemporary discourses and practices in 
North America and Australia. In this and other regards, Indige-
nous child removal can be seen not as a past event but rather, to 
an extent, as an ongoing process. The legacies of Indigenous 
child removal, it has been shown, are evidenced by hyperincar-
ceration109 and other criminal justice issues110—as well as in the 
child welfare system111 and other areas of law and policy.112 The 
generational segregation analogy provided here expands and 
adds layers to this critical conversation, by highlighting how In-
digenous child removal has transcended not only the times but 
also the countries where it occurred; how it has transmigrated 
and, in a sense, reemerged in the form of analogous practices 
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beyond North America and Australia, such as the generational 
segregation of Palestinians in Israeli custody. Moreover, this re-
cent development in Israel/Palestine has not received the scru-
tiny it deserves, possibly due to its invocation of taken-for-
granted social and legal norms about childhood and children’s 
“best interests.” Analogizing the Israeli-Palestinian situation to 
Indigenous child removal therefore helps problematize a con-
temporary development that has hitherto largely escaped criti-
cal notice. 
II. ALREADY ANALOGIZED 
Three engagements with analogies, some more direct than oth-
ers, have emerged thus far. First, Palestinians’ encounters with 
analogies in prison, including analogies concerning settler-In-
digenous conflicts and, specifically, Indigenous child removal in 
North America and Australia. Second, Israeli authorities’ crack-
down on the studies that brought together these prisoners and 
analogies. Finally, this article’s attempt to revive and explore, 
through the generational segregation analogy, the critical poten-
tial of Palestinian prisoners’ interaction with analogies. 
None of these, however, have taken place in a social or histor-
ical vacuum. Their surrounding legal and political discourses are 
rife with analogies, tying contemporary Israel/Palestine to other 
times and places, including those discussed in this article. For 
example, a few years after the U.S. involvement in the Gulf War, 
Uri Shoham, Israel’s former military advocate general at the 
time and currently an Israeli supreme court justice, published 
an article in the (U.S. journal) Military Law Review, opening 
with the following hypothetical analog to Israel’s rule over the 
Palestinian territory: 
[I]magine the United States being in control of an area of land 
a quarter its own size, located just scant miles away from major 
United States cities, and populated by no less than 120 million 
Iraqis. With a few minor adjustments, these are the circum-
stances Israel has had to face since [assuming control over the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip in] 1967.113 
More recently, the Israeli military drew a similar hypothetical 
analogy to garner international support for its 2014 offensive on 
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the Gaza Strip. It disseminated an image online depicting rock-
ets heading toward the Statue of Liberty in New York, with a 
caption that read: “What would you do?”114 
Israel’s supreme court has likewise drawn analogies between 
Israeli and U.S. counterinsurgency laws as grounds, among oth-
ers, for denying petitions against the detention of Palestinians 
without trial.115 Over in the United States, in 2005, a Central 
Intelligence Agency attorney, seeking to garner legislative sup-
port for continued use of controversial interrogation methods, 
analogized the public debate on the matter to the situation in 
Israel. As he described it, the Israeli supreme court had “ruled 
that several . . . [interrogation] techniques were possibly permis-
sible, but require[d] . . . legislative sanction” and the Israeli gov-
ernment “ultimately got limited legislative authority for . . . spe-
cific techniques.”116 
Analogies thus align themselves with both state and counter-
state ideologies, thereby lending themselves to different and 
even competing uses in different hands. Because analogies can 
be imbued with varying effects, there is a need for a more nu-
anced understanding of how analogies—such as the genera-
tional segregation analogy developed in this article—operate, or 
can operate. Before theorizing this issue more broadly, the arti-
cle will now analyze its concrete manifestations in one particu-
larly relevant type of analogy, which also appears in the aca-
demic course books to which Israeli authorities have denied Pal-
estinians access:117 that concerning settler-Indigenous relations 
in North America, Australia, and Israel/Palestine. 
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Aside from the course books now out of Palestinian prisoners’ 
reach, such analogies have figured centrally in contemporary 
cross-national solidarity activities, among other sites. This 
global solidarity project serves as a context within which to 
place, and through which to better understand, the implications 
of the analogies at the heart of this article—among other reasons 
because Palestinian prisoners themselves have studied the ex-
periences of anticolonial and liberation movements elsewhere.118 
Thus, in a recent statement in support of Indigenous sovereignty 
and rights in Canada, a Palestinian group pointed to “deep con-
nections and similarities between our peoples.”119 Recently, a 
Palestinian student from Gaza fleshed out this analogy in an 
open letter supporting Native American-led demonstrations: 
When I read your history, I can see myself and my people re-
flected in yours . . . America’s policy of occupation and displace-
ment . . . and the gradual transfer of so many of your people to 
massive, impoverished reservations, hurts me deeply because 
it is so similar to the ethnic cleansing of my ancestors by the 
Israeli military occupation. . . . Like you, we don’t control our 
natural resources.120 
Drawing a reverse analogy, Canadian First Nations author 
Lee Maracle has called Palestinians the “Indians of the Middle 
East.”121 Similarly, after a visit to the West Bank, a member of 
a delegation of U.S. Indigenous and other nonwhite women de-
picted the situation there as “a high-speed and high-tech version 
of the colonization of our Indigenous homelands.”122 On another 
occasion, one of several Canadian activists recounted how they 
had raised the Palestinian and Mohawk flags on the same pole 
to show solidarity and drew the following analogy: “[W]e would . 
. . think, we are one, and the winds carry our colours together 
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from Jerusalem to the Grand River. . . . Our struggles are one.”123 
A group of Native American academics likewise publicly as-
serted: “Indigenous Peoples’ experience parallels what has hap-
pened to the occupied Palestinians. . . . [Both] have suffered 
through the process of settlement, colonization, or militarization 
of their homelands.”124 
This latter analogy is representative of a recent wave of schol-
arship analogizing Palestinians to North American or Austral-
ian Indigenous people, including: a critique of Israeli jurispru-
dence on Palestinian-Bedouin property rights through the legal 
framework of Australian native title jurisprudence,125 a schol-
arly analogy between the legal regimes dispossessing Palestini-
ans and Native Americans from national resources,126 an anal-
ogy between Palestinian and Native American poetry,127 and 
analogies between (primarily literary) discourses surrounding 
Palestinians and Native Americans.128 Another Native Ameri-
can academic and activist pointed not only to parallels but also 
to chronological overlap in “our shared histories . . . with Pales-
tinian people,” analogizing the Nakba—the mass displacement 
of Palestinians in 1948—to the “mass relocation of Native 
[American] people off of tribal lands . . . around the [same] 
time.”129 
Yet, as with Israeli and U.S. legal discourses,130 it is often state 
supporters and allies that resort to analogies of their own, 
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overtly or implicitly countering such critical analogies. Certain 
North American Indigenous public figures have thus analogized 
their peoples not to Palestinians but to Israeli Jews.131 Such 
analogies, however, have garnered criticism from other North 
American Indigenous people for complicity in what they term 
“redwashing”—Israel’s attempt to fend off international censure 
by associating itself with Indigenous peoples.132 A major bone of 
contention within this battlefield of analogies is thus the ques-
tion of entitlement to claim Indigenous status in Israel/Pales-
tine.133 
Israeli state officials, lawyers, and soldiers, too, have ex-
plained or legitimized their actions by means of analogy, though 
the analogue to Israeli Jews has varied: white settlers in some 
cases, and Indigenous people in others. Former Israeli prime 
minister Ariel Sharon once told a U.S. official: “We have learned 
a lot from you Americans, how you moved West.”134 Soldiers in 
the Israeli military’s Golani brigade have long referred to them-
selves not as settlers but as (American) “Indians.”135 In 2016, a 
photograph was published of a soldier wearing a shirt with a 
picture of a Native American chief and the text: “When . . . the 
Indian [analogously, the Israeli soldier] hits, every Arab mother 
shall cry.”136 A legal advisor to an Israeli municipality, invoking 
the infamous terra nullius doctrine while criticizing the market-
ing of a land for residential development, asserted that the cur-
rent residents “are not [American] Indians. This is not an empty 
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land.”137 On another occasion, the Israeli supreme court made 
reference to U.S. federal legal protections for Indigenous burial 
sites, despite ultimately authorizing construction on Muslim 
cemetery grounds.138 
Contextualized in this light, Palestinians’ analogy-oriented 
studies in Israeli prison, and Israeli authorities’ crackdown on 
these studies, can be understood as part of a broader battle-
ground of analogies regarding Indigenous-settler relations. In 
this discursive terrain, it is the opponents of counter-official 
analogies themselves who continuously deploy analogies invok-
ing settlers and Indigenous people. In fact, opposing sides some-
times utilize the exact same analogy. In a 2013 meeting of the 
Israeli parliamentary Interior and Environmental Affairs Com-
mittee, for instance, the committee chair dismissed allegations 
that a bill under discussion would continue the forced transfer 
and dispossession of Palestinian Bedouins and suggested that 
this would be no worse than “what the Americans did to the In-
dians,” thus making light of Palestinians’ and Native Americans’ 
situations at the same time. A member of an opposition party 
responded reprovingly: “I very rarely agree with you, Madam 
Chairwoman. Precisely as they did to the Indians. Indeed. Israe-
lis and Americans are in the same boat.”139 Also imbued with 
competing meanings has been an analogy to the American “Wild 
West.” A former Deputy Speaker of the Israeli parliament, on 
the one hand, has applied this analogy to Israel’s allegedly un-
ruly Palestinian citizens.140 On the other hand, other Israeli pol-
iticians have suggested that it is certain Jewish settlers in the 
West Bank who are the lawless analog.141 
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Despite transformation over time, such historical-geograph-
ical analogies are hardly new. Throughout the past two centu-
ries, similar analogies have occupied an important place in dis-
courses surrounding Israel/Palestine, North America, and Aus-
tralia, providing a historical context for better understanding 
the analogies examined and introduced by this article. Thus, 
while some prestatehood Zionists undertook to distance them-
selves from imperialism,142 others, including prominent activists 
and thinkers, frequently and unapologetically analogized them-
selves to European settlers in North America or elsewhere. 
Speaking in the United States in 1915, David Ben-Gurion, later 
Israel’s first prime minister, vowed that Jewish settlers in Pal-
estine would “turn the wasteland and desolation into a flourish-
ing . . . oasis, as did the English settlers in North America.”143 
Harking back to the “history of American settlement,” he ex-
tolled the “herculean . . . tasks of the colonists who came to find 
the new Homeland in the New World” and their “fierce . . . fights 
. . . with wild nature and wilder redskins, the sacrifices made 
before they unlocked the continent for mass influx and coloniza-
tion.”144 Years later, as incumbent prime minister, he urged an 
audience of U.S. Jews in Israel to consider themselves “on the 
edge of colonization,” in a mission even more difficult than the 
“conquest of the Wild West.”145 
In 1921, Israel’s future first president, Chaim Weizmann, en-
couraged the members of the World Zionist Congress that, un-
like the history of “British dominions,” Jews were making re-
markable achievements in Palestine, especially considering “the 
inevitable percentage of failures which occurs in all colonizing 
work.”146 Similar analogies appeared in The Iron Wall, the fa-
mous essay by revisionist Zionist leader Vladimir Jabotinsky: 
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That the Arabs of the Land of Israel should willingly come to 
an agreement with us is beyond all hopes. . . . [Those] “great 
explorers,” the English, Scots and Dutch who were the first real 
pioneers of North America . . . not only wished to leave the red-
skins at peace but could also pity a fly. . . . But the native re-
sisted both barbarian and civilized settler with the same de-
gree of cruelty. . . . [There] has never been an indigenous in-
habitant anywhere or at any time who has ever accepted the 
settlement of others in his country. . . . And so it is for the Ar-
abs. . . . They look upon Palestine with the same instinctive 
love and true fervor that any Aztec looked upon his Mexico or 
any Sioux looked upon his prairie.147 
Conversely, in the United States, the Indigenous population 
has long been analogized to Palestine’s Arabs. Nineteenth-cen-
tury landscape paintings in the Southwest frequently featured 
Native Americans in clothing and scenery akin to those of Bed-
ouin Arabs, and one of the era’s travel authors expressed aston-
ishment at how Palestine’s “Arabs can hear and recognize each 
other’s voices” using “distinctive cries, corresponding to the 
whoops of our Indians.”148 Twentieth-century U.S. tourist guides 
and travelogues romanticized Palestinians (particularly Bedou-
ins) as omnipotent Native American chiefs, and one 1955 guide 
described a Bedouin encampment as “Israel’s ‘Red Indian Re-
serve’” and a Jewish Kibbutz as having “features of a Texan fron-
tier post.”149 
Related analogies appeared outside the United States and Is-
rael/Palestine as well. In 1937, Winston Churchill, the United 
Kingdom’s would-be prime minister, publicly likened Palestini-
ans to a dog in the manger, adding: 
I do not agree that the dog in a manger has the final right to 
the manger even though he may have lain there for a long time. 
I do not admit that right. I do not admit, for instance, that a 
great wrong has been done to the Red Indians of America, or 
the black [i.e., Aboriginal] people of Australia . . . by the fact 
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that . . . a higher grade race . . . has come in and taken their 
place.150 
A few years later, British Labour Member of Parliament, Rich-
ard Crossman, drew a similar analogy. While serving on the gov-
ernment-appointed Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry into 
the Problems of European Jewry and Palestine, he analogized 
Zionism to the way “the American settler developed the West” 
and Palestine’s Arabs to “the aboriginal who must go down be-
fore the march of progress.”151 
As this two-century long discursive tapestry indicates, analo-
gies are already ubiquitous. Analogy is a key mode of acting, 
thinking, and communicating,152 central to law153 and politics.154 
Some, like essayist and poet Ralph Waldo Emerson and philoso-
pher Friedrich Nietzsche, have gone as far as asserting, respec-
tively, that “[a]ll thinking is analogising,”155 and “[e]very concept 
arises from the equation of unequal things.”156 
This near unavoidability of analogies carries at least two im-
plications. First, analogies such as those offered by this article, 
by the Israeli Open University course book, or by other scholarly 
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sources cited in this article,157 are best understood not as exter-
nal observations removed from their object of inquiry, but as 
part and parcel of an already analogy-laden discourse. A second 
implication is that a critical inquiry is needed not (only) into 
whether to utilize such analogies, but rather into how analogies 
operate, can operate, and are prevented from operating and 
what they facilitate or obstruct within specific settings and 
framings. 
III. ANALOGY’S FRAMEWORKS 
Thus far, the article has put forward the generational segrega-
tion analogy (in Part I) and has then contextualized this analogy 
within analogies concerning settler-Indigenous relations (in 
Part II). This Part will investigate analogy at a broader concep-
tual level, in and beyond the generational segregation and set-
tler-Indigenous contexts. At the center of inquiry will be the re-
lationship between analogy and framing—a relationship that ex-
ists on at least two levels. First, debates about the value and 
aptness of any given historical-geographical analogy are framed 
in certain ways, resting on particular assumptions about the 
meaning and nature of the concept “analogy.” Second, such anal-
ogies themselves are conceptual, interpretive, and narrative 
frameworks, delimited and constrained by specific geographical 
and historical demarcations. As is the case with all frame-
works,158 each of these levels of framing simultaneously (albeit 
never fully) excludes and includes, opens up and hinders, en-
trenches and silences. Hereafter, this article will ruminate over 
these two levels of framing, thereby self-reflexively considering 
its own method—analogy. In so doing, this article seeks to think 
not only with but also beyond, or even against, historical-geo-
graphical analogies. 
More specifically, the discussion that follows problematizes 
three pertinent framings of analogies: (a) legalistic analogies re-
lating to generational segregation, in which the broader field of 
child law and policy remains uncontested; (b) rigid conceptuali-
zations of (settler) colonialism in debates on analogies between 
North America, Australia, and Israel/Palestine; and (c) a ten-
dency, widespread in debates on the (settler-)colonial analogy as 
well as on other historical-geographical analogies, to reduce 
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analogy to similarity. This conceptual analysis aims to contrib-
ute to more nuanced and self-reflexive usage of, and thinking 
about, analogies such as those under examination. 
Moreover, by placing generational segregation within the spe-
cific contexts of child law and policy and (settler) colonialism, 
this Part will throw light on both its idiosyncrasies and its com-
monalities with each of these contexts. On the one hand, placing 
generational segregation within these contexts can bring out its 
connections and parallels with other child-related or settler-co-
lonial practices. On the other hand, this can highlight the speci-
ficity of generational segregation—vis-à-vis settler-colonial 
practices less directly centered around child-adult relations and 
child-focused interventions less intertwined with settler coloni-
alism. 
A. Legalistic Analogies Concerning Generational Segregation 
The generational segregation analogy advanced in this article 
can shed new light on past and present child-related discourses 
and practices. But, in singling out generational segregation in 
North America, Australia, and Israel/Palestine, this analogy 
might also be misunderstood to regard these as dark chapters in 
an otherwise benign history, or field, of child law and policy.159 
Exemplifying this pitfall are scholarly assertions that Indige-
nous child removal was “in violation of children’s rights as de-
fined by . . . the United Nations . . . including . . . the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child.”160 
Such criticism of generational segregation is formulated in the 
sort of legalistic or liberal rule-of-law161 terms that dominate 
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child-centered jurisprudence.162 In so doing, they might repro-
duce an insufficiently critical stance toward a sociolegal field de-
serving of much greater suspicion. 
What such a legalistic approach overlooks is that generational 
segregation in North America, Australia, or Israel/Palestine—
notwithstanding its undeniable specificities—typifies rather 
than deviates from child law and policy in multiple ways. In its 
modern form, this legal-political field developed, in part, as a 
means to remove poor and working-class children and civilize 
them away from their allegedly depraved or unfit parents, often 
in the name of national interests.163 Separation was seen as nec-
essary because, without it, parental influences would have un-
dermined the children’s moral instruction.164 As a growing body 
of literature has explained, child-related interventions through-
out modern times—whether iterated as “child saving,” “child 
welfare,” “children’s rights,” or “juvenile justice”—have all too 
often worked to children’s detriment.165 To date, disadvantaged 
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socioeconomic, racial, and ethnic groups continue to be ill-served 
and disproportionately targeted.166 Notwithstanding undeniable 
transformations, contemporary child law still enshrines princi-
ples akin to those invoked in justification of generational segre-
gation,167 such as separation, “best interests,” and “rehabilita-
tion.”168 
At a more fundamental level, the sociolegal category “child,” in 
its modern iterations, is premised on, and reinforces, the same 
essentialism undergirding generational separation: the assump-
tion that all those classified as “children” are one and the same, 
sharing relatively similar traits (such as plasticity) and needs 
(such as special treatment). This notion tends to efface the cul-
turally and historically contingent nature of the construct “child-
hood,” the infinite disparity among “children,” their weighty 
commonalities with “adults,” and the social forces invested in re-
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producing the seemingly natural child-adult divide. While ex-
ceeding the scope of this article, this essentialism has been crit-
icized and deconstructed elsewhere,169 even if legalistic writing 
largely overlooks these critical insights.170 It is in order to call 
into question these supposedly self-evident and benevolent or-
derings and conceptions of childhood and adulthood—as well as 
to highlight the importance of generation as a social-political 
unit171—that this article employs the potentially explosive 
phrase “generational segregation.”172 
Given this, it should come as no surprise that the history of 
child law and policy is full of examples, beyond the four focused 
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on in this article (concerning the United States, Canada, Aus-
tralia, and Israel/Palestine), of both generational segregation 
and attempts at reeducating Indigenous or ethnic minority chil-
dren.173 Thus, over a period spanning half a century up to the 
mid-1970s, hundreds of children of Yenish origin in Switzerland 
(often described as “gypsies” or “gypsy-like”) were forcefully and 
systematically removed from their birth families. These children 
were placed with foster families or in institutions in an effort to 
assimilate them into dominant society.174 In the 1950s, Danish 
authorities, assisted by international charities, took a group of 
Inuit children from their families in Greenland and placed them 
with foster families in Denmark to be reeducated as “little 
Danes”. Most of the children were later returned to Greenland 
but placed in a special children’s home, where they were discour-
aged from speaking their Inuit language.175 During French colo-
nial rule in Morocco, “mixed-race” children were likewise trans-
ferred from their purportedly unfit mothers to orphanages,176 
while in the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) child protection 
agencies endeavored “to remove [such children] . . . as early as 
possible from the influence of native . . . mothers.”177 Between 
the fourteenth and seventeenth centuries, boys in the Ottoman 
Empire were taken from rural Christian families in the Balkans, 
converted to Islam, and conscripted into military or civil ser-
vice.178 
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In addition, laws and policies encouraging the assimilation or 
“civilization” of Indigenous or ethnic minority children through 
boarding schools were put in place across the globe: from Latin 
America in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, through co-
lonial Sierra Leone in the nineteenth century and New Zealand 
in its early days, to the Soviet Union in the 1920s and certain 
provinces in China from 1949 into the 1980s.179 Generational 
segregation was also imposed on groups other than Indigenous 
peoples or ethnic minorities. For instance, thousands of Spanish 
parents who were deemed either politically dangerous or mor-
ally or economically deficient are believed to have had their ba-
bies taken away and placed with “approved” families for nearly 
half a century until the 1990s.180 
Specifically, North America, Australia, and Israel/Palestine 
each have wider histories of generational segregation and sub-
jugation through education. Among other things, in North Amer-
ica and Australia, there were other child removals, some preced-
ing the ones on which this article focuses. Among them were re-
movals of Indigenous children in the pre-boarding-school era 
and removals of children from poor or working-class families.181 
As a case in point, for nearly eight decades, up until 1929, legally 
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authorized charities in the United States transferred an esti-
mated 200,000 to 250,000 children (mostly from impoverished 
immigrant families who sometimes had to file lawsuits to re-
claim the children) for indenture or adoption in faraway parts of 
the country.182 Within North American studies, parallels have 
also been observed between boarding schools for Indigenous chil-
dren, contemporaneous industrial and correctional schools for 
lower-class white children,183 and earlier forms of assimilative 
schooling.184 
In Palestine, English missionaries during Ottoman and Brit-
ish rule endeavored to convert local children to Christianity 
through removal and education.185 In the 1940s and 1950s, in-
ternational Jewish organizations operating in North Africa 
viewed local Jewish parents as incorrigibly degenerate, made ef-
forts to separate them from their children, and arranged for 
some children to be put up for adoption.186 In 1950s Israel, in-
fants of non-European Jewish immigrants, primarily of 
Yemenite origin—whom earlier Zionists described as inferior 
“Arab hybrids”187—were reputedly abducted for adoption.188 In 
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addition, Palestinian citizen children in Israel, whose school sys-
tem is separate from the Jewish one, are required to learn about 
Jewish values and culture, while their curriculum excludes ex-
pressions of Palestinian nationalism and other possible chal-
lenges to dominant Zionist narratives.189 
Moreover, isolating the four referents of the generational seg-
regation analogy (the United States, Canada, Australia, and Is-
rael/Palestine) from this global context also overlooks the trans-
national nature of such segregation. Certain forms of genera-
tional segregation, such as large-scale child emigration, trans-
national adoption, and child evacuation schemes and initiatives, 
are transnational by definition. Examples abound here as well. 
For about a century, beginning in the late 1860s (a “shameful 
episode of history,” as British prime minister Gordon Brown 
would later describe it), government-funded charities dispatched 
tens of thousands of British children (between 80,000 and 
150,000 according to different estimates) to Canada, Australia, 
New Zealand, and Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). Most of 
the children were from poor, primarily working-class house-
holds, and many of them have since spoken of the suffering 
caused by their removal and, in some cases, their subsequent 
abuse or neglect.190 
Irish babies labelled as “illegitimate”, too, were sent by the 
thousands for adoption overseas between the early 1940s and 
mid-1960s, mostly to the United States, sometimes without their 
mothers’ consent.191 From 1963 to 1982, French authorities in 
the Indian Ocean island of Réunion forcibly sent 1,615 children 
of poor and illiterate parents to France to work on farms or as 
servants to bourgeois families.192 Like all of these, mass child 
evacuations in perceived welfare emergencies overseas have also 
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drawn criticism. The largest evacuation, “Operation Babylift”—
the airlifting of over 2,500 Vietnamese children to the United 
States and other countries in 1975—was criticized for “kidnap-
ping” children who could have been better off remaining in their 
homeland.193 
The transnational character of generational segregation also 
manifests itself in interconnections between the Indigenous 
child removal and reeducation policies of the United States, Can-
ada, and Australia. In the late 1870s, Canadian prime minister 
John MacDonald commissioned Nicholas Davin, a journalist and 
future member of parliament, to examine the use of residential 
schools for Indigenous children in the United States. Following 
meetings with senior U.S. officials and visits to some of these 
schools, Davin’s highly influential report strongly recommended 
emulating the neighboring country’s model.194 After continuous 
visits to the United States until the late 1970s, Canadian offi-
cials further suggested adopting key elements of the schooling of 
Indigenous children across the border. In addition, U.S. and Ca-
nadian officials occasionally exchanged ideas about, and teach-
ing materials for, Indigenous boarding schools, and school staff 
also drew upon the other country’s schools when negotiating 
with government authorities.195 In Australia, institutions for In-
digenous children were managed by the same umbrella churches 
as in Canada.196 
                                                                                                             
 193. See Kathleen J. S. Bergquist, Operation Babylift or Babyabduction?: Im-
plications of the Hague Convention on the humanitarian evacuation and ‘res-
cue’ of children, 52 INT’L SOC. WORK 621 (2009). 
 194. MILLOY, supra note 4; Woolford & Gacek, supra note 101. 
 195. WOOLFORD, supra note 47, at 71, 78, 90–91, 117–18. 
 196. MARY ELLEN TURPEL-LAFOND—REPRESENTATIVE FOR CHILDREN AND 
YOUTH PROVINCE OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, ABORIGINAL CHILDREN: HUMAN RIGHTS 
AS A LENS TO BREAK THE INTERGENERATIONAL LEGACY OF RESIDENTIAL SCHOOLS 
(July 2012), https://www.rcybc.ca/sites/default/files/documents/pdf/re-
ports_publications/20120701_truthandreconciliationsubmission.pdf. Moreo-
ver, inter-country influences and links extended beyond child removal and ed-
ucation. In 1886, future U.S. president and then-Civil Service Commissioner 
Theodore Roosevelt drew analogies to, and lessons from, Canada’s handling of 
its “Indian problem.” WOOLFORD, supra note 47, at 65. Australian officials also 
showed some awareness of policies toward Indigenous people on the other side 
of the Pacific: for instance, in 1929, the Minister of State for Home Affairs, 
when discussing a proposal to establish reservations for Aborigines, declared 
that “the Government would try to exercise control on the lines of the Indian 
Reservations in the United States and Canada.” JACOBS, supra note 47, at 51. 
2017] Ties of Separation 729 
More recently, former Canadian prime minister, Stephen Har-
per, remarked in his public apology that the Indian Residential 
School system “was infamously said ‘to kill the Indian in the 
child’”197 (a saying also quoted in the Israeli Open University 
course book on genocide,198 to which Palestinian prisoners have 
been denied access). While Canadian officials charged with “ed-
ucating” the Indigenous population did indeed frequently voice 
this dictum,199 it actually originated from the United States, 
where it had been coined by no other than the highly influential 
Richard Pratt.200 
The practices and discourses surrounding Indigenous child re-
moval also traversed further, beyond these national boundaries 
and historical epochs. In North America and Australia, Indige-
nous child removal largely had legal and philosophical origins 
traceable to eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Britain.201 In 
Canada, it also drew inspiration from Swiss manual labor 
schools.202 The use of “before” and “after” photographs to show 
children’s supposedly successful transformation, a practice 
honed by British child rescuers,203 was later used in boarding 
schools for Indigenous children in North America,204 as well as 
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in Indigenous child removal in Australia.205 At the same time, 
over in Britain, Native American children were being portrayed 
as inferior and pitiful, while the press and literature reported: 
“The American and Canadian governments are trying hard to 
make . . . wandering [Indian] men into good citizens”; “[t]hey can 
do little with the grown-up people, but the children they are try-
ing to send to school.”206 
While street children in Britain were analogized to both “Ar-
abs” and uncivilized indigenes,207 the British Mandate govern-
ment in Palestine laid the legal foundations for Israel’s future 
generational segregation of Palestinians between the 1920s and 
1940s. This included introducing the youth court system, vari-
ous related laws,208 and an array of emergency regulations, 
many of which currently remain in force.209 In fact, more than 
sixty years before Israel established so-called “military youth 
courts” as part of the increased generational segregation,210 the 
British emergency regulations in Palestine were amended to au-
thorize military courts to act as juvenile courts.211 It is also from 
British Mandate legislation212 that Israeli law borrowed age cat-
egories that are still applied (exclusively) to Palestinian child 
defendants.213 
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Against this non-exhaustive backdrop, if analogies concerning 
generational segregation are to fulfill as much of their critical 
potential as possible, they must have child law and policy within 
their frame of critique, in plain view. This requires overcoming 
legalistic tendencies and the common depiction, explicitly or im-
plicitly, of contexts like those on which this article centers as ex-
ceptions to an otherwise benign legal and political field. Recent 
scholarship on Indigenous child removal214 represents an effort 
in this direction, and so do studies pointing to parallels and con-
tinuities between present-day law concerning migrant children 
and past policies pertaining to Native American children.215 This 
conversion, however, is still in its infancy.  
B. Rigid Conceptualizations of (Settler) Colonialism                 
in Debates About Analogies Between North America,            
Australia, and Israel/Palestine 
Also pertinent to the present context—along with legalistic 
analogies—are analogies that invoke “colonialism” generally or 
“settler colonialism” specifically. These concepts often appear in 
academic calls for analogies between the United States, Canada, 
Australia, and Israel/Palestine,216 as well as in three scholarly 
fields highly relevant to this article. First, scholars who develop 
analogies concerning settler-Indigenous dynamics often do so 
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while directly or implicitly describing the countries they analo-
gize as either settler217 or settler-colonial.218 Second, the Israeli 
Open University course book on genocide attaches the terms 
“settler” and “colonial” to, and invites related analogies between, 
the United States, Israel, and Australia.219 Finally, cross-na-
tional studies of Indigenous child removal have likewise evoked 
these categories.220 In addition, as this article has shown,221 
these terms have occupied a significant place outside academic 
circles as well, in discourses ranging from present-day inter-
country solidarity campaigns to past political and cultural de-
bates. 
Despite inevitably being open to multiple definitions, interpre-
tations, and applications, the terms “colonialism” and “settler co-
lonialism” are often treated as self-explanatory, and their mean-
ing for those debating them hence remains unarticulated, inex-
plicit, and unexplored. Two rigid conceptualizations of these cat-
egories—common in and beyond debates about analogies be-
tween Israel/Palestine, North America, and Australia—warrant 
critical attention here. 
First, despite nuanced writing on the subject,222 some re-
sponses to such analogies frame the categories “colonialism” and 
“settler colonialism” as applying to rigid political “units,” or his-
torical “epochs.”223 Though these categories may indeed be of 
more analytical relevance to certain contexts than others, such 
rigid framing overlooks the traces colonialism—seldom fully 
obeying such geographical or temporal boundaries—is bound to 
leave elsewhere. Further, imagining there to be a distinct or sep-
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arable colonial order neglects the prevalence, within liberal “nor-
malcy,” of attributes some scholars224 associate with colonialism, 
such as a normalized state of exception, legal indeterminacy, or 
institutionalized discrimination.225 Indeed, generational segre-
gation and related practices bear links and parallels across 
times and spaces that may not align themselves with some com-
mon framings of colonialism.226 These include, for example, 
framings that place Switzerland (whose child policies are men-
tioned in this article)227 outside colonialism due to its lack of for-
mer colonies, despite the country’s complicity in past colonialism 
and its contemporary colonial undertones.228 Moreover, such 
rigid framings also oversimplify colonialism by downplaying its 
ever-mutating nature and, simultaneously, overstating its all-
encompassing domination of “colonial” times and spaces. 
A second rigid framing assesses the (settler) colonialism anal-
ogy on the basis of a set of supposed similarities to either other 
settler-colonial instances or some imagined prototype. One en-
counters this approach in definitional controversies, not explic-
itly over the meaning of (settler) colonialism itself, but over what 
characteristics a certain context must possess in order to qualify 
as either colonial or settler-colonial. For example, some consider 
settler migration from a single European country to be such a 
necessary characteristic and argue that, absent this element, 
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prestatehood Zionism cannot be regarded as a colonial move-
ment.229 Others, in contrast, delimit colonialism as including 
various examples—Zionism being only one—of substantial set-
tler populations that were not nationals of the metropolitan gov-
ernment.230 Such debates, however, emanate from a particular, 
checklist-like reduction of (settler) colonialism to questions of 
similarity. 
In contrast, other frameworks may open up alternative ways 
of engaging with these categories and the analogies that use 
them. Instead of rigid boundaries or similarities, settler coloni-
alism can be conceptualized around a certain mode of operation. 
In his widely cited writing on the subject, Patrick Wolfe defined 
settler colonialism as hallmarked by a “logic of elimination.” By 
this he referred to the attempt to establish and perpetually sus-
tain a colonial society in the expropriated territory by culturally, 
socially, or physically destroying the Indigenous population.231 
                                                                                                             
 229. Oren Barak, Between the Nation State Vision and a Multicultural Real-
ity: A Comparative Look at Lebanon and the Land of Israel/Palestine, 35 
TEORIA U’VIKORET [THEORY & CRITICISM] 193, 197 (2009) (Hebrew); see also 
Elkins & Pedersen, supra note 223, at 4. 
 230. John Reynolds, Anti-Colonial Legalities: Paradigms, Tactics & Strategy, 
18 PALESTINE Y.B. INT’L L. 8, 12 n. 11 (2015). In addition to definitions, another 
bone of contention in disputes on the applicability of “colonialism” is history. 
This is evidenced by former prime minister Stephen Harper’s 2009 assertion 
that Canada has “no history of colonialism.” Andrew Crosby & Jeffrey Mona-
ghan, Settler governmentality in Canada and the Algonquins of Barriere Lake, 
43 SEC. DIALOGUE 421, 421–22 (2012). Another example is the claim that Zion-
ism was never colonial because it did not draw support from an imperial power, 
as argued by Shmuel Hirsch & Uri Cohen, Remarks on Israeli Sociology in 
Light of From Yishuv to State, in 10 IYUNIM BI-TKUMAT ISRAEL [INQUIRIES IN 
ISRAEL’S REVIVAL] 317, 341–42 (2000) (Hebrew). Other examples are the coun-
ter-arguments that Zionism developed “in the womb of British colonialism” and 
is heavily buttressed by “America’s carte blanche military, economic and polit-
ical support.” See, respectively, John Strawson, Reflections on Edward Said 
and the Legal Narratives of Palestine: Israeli Settlements and Palestinian Self-
Determination, 20 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 363, 377 (2002); Jonas F. Gjersø, Is-
rael—The Last of the Settler Colonies, CIVILISING MISSION (Aug. 16, 2014), 
http://thecivilisingmission.com/2014/08/16/israel-the-last-of-the-settler-colo-
nies/. 
 231. Patrick Wolfe, Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native, 8 
J. GENOCIDE RES. 387, 387–89 (2006). Another key distinguishing characteris-
tic that has been attributed to settler colonialism is a relatively large settler 
population that seeks to become the majority group. See, e.g., Gershon Shafir, 
Zionism and colonialism: a comparative approach, in THE ISRAEL/PALESTINE 
QUESTION: A READER 78, 80–81 (Ilan Pappé ed., 2d ed. 2007); Daiva Stasiulis 
2017] Ties of Separation 735 
Wolfe conceptualized this settler-colonial mode of operation 
fairly flexibly, akin to a Wittgensteinian “family resem-
blance,”232 by pointing out that it takes on different forms and 
strategies, varying and potentially evolving over time and 
space.233 As he noted, these may include, but are not limited to, 
child removal and other forms of social fragmentation or cultural 
assimilation as well as displacement, mass killing, demographic 
control, and geographical renaming.234 
Through this alternative conceptual framework, generational 
segregation can be better contextualized vis-à-vis the broader 
settler-colonial matrix from which it partly draws its effect and 
meaning. Like generational segregation, related legal and polit-
ical mechanisms within this matrix target not necessarily an in-
dividual body or subject but the collective subjugated socio-polit-
ical body. Some of these mechanisms, as noted by Wolfe, do so 
through a combination of segregation and fragmentation.235 Ex-
amples include Israel’s recruitment and use of Palestinian in-
formants inside and outside prison, breeding distrust between 
Palestinians and thereby potentially weakening their collective 
resistance and solidarity.236 This particular form of sociopolitical 
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fragmentation has benefitted from the increased generational 
segregation of Palestinians in Israeli custody: children are de-
nied contact with Palestinian adults—including the adult in-
mates but also the children’s parents and prospective attorney—
which makes it easier for the Israeli authorities to recruit these 
children as informants.237 The separation of Palestinian citizens 
of Israel who are classified as “security prisoners” from their 
noncitizen Palestinian counterparts is another practice that 
amalgamates segregation and fragmentation with the “rehabili-
tation” discourse: as part of its persistent emphasis on the im-
portance of such separation,238 the Israeli supreme court, invok-
ing yet again rehabilitation in the service of segregation, has 
warned that interaction between these two Palestinian popula-
tions would lead to “anti-rehabilitation.”239 Moreover, the Israeli 
prison authorities have reportedly segregated Palestinian in-
mates into facilities, wards, and cells on the basis of their regions 
of residence,240 while also isolating those whose influence is 
deemed especially perilous, such as hunger strikers.241 All the 
while, outside prison, in line with what Israeli officials have pub-
licly called Israel’s “separation policy,”242 the Gaza Strip has 
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ENG.pdf; see also Ari Shavit, Top PM Aide: Gaza Plan Aims to Freeze the Peace 
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been cut off from the West Bank,243 while the latter has been 
steadily parcelled into enclaves.244 The consequent restriction of 
physical movement takes place in tandem with Israel’s re-
striction of the movement of imagination—through denial of 
analogy-laden studies—between different times and places. 
Social and territorial disintegration was the lot of North Amer-
ican Indigenous people too, in and beyond the contexts of child 
removal and boarding schools. Thus, in 1888, a U.S. official de-
scribed boarding schools as designed to imbue the Indigenous 
student “with the exalting egotism of American civilization, so 
that he will say ‘I’ instead of ‘We,’ and ‘This is mine,’ instead of 
‘This is ours.’”245 Richard Pratt set the Indigenous prisoners on 
whom he experimented with rehabilitation246 against one an-
other by having them guard, scout out, and punish each other.247 
Later, Pratt likewise had students in his boarding school pun-
ished severely by courts-martial made up of their peers.248 The 
U.S. General Allotment Act of 1887 and subsequent amend-
ments further fragmented Indigenous communities by breaking 
up their lands into small, individually owned parcels.249 Similar 
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measures were imposed on Canada’s Indigenous population, al-
beit without such legislative basis.250 
Counterinsurgency and “national security”—themes discussed 
in this article in relation to generational segregation251—also of-
ten accompany settler colonialism252 and can therefore be part of 
the contextualization proposed here. Like the treatment of Pal-
estinians by dominant Israeli Jewish society,253 albeit to a dif-
ferent degree, Canada and the United States have time and 
again considered their Indigenous populations a “national secu-
rity” threat. The U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs—a federal agency 
in the Department of the Interior—was originally located within 
the War Department and was run with assistance from military 
commanders.254 More recently, lawyers in the George W. Bush 
administration analogized nineteenth-century Native American 
tribes to present-day terrorists, and this analogy was later reit-
erated by the Obama administration and the U.S. Court of Mil-
itary Commission Review.255 In the late 1980s, Canada’s Senate 
Special Committee on Terrorism and Public Safety warned that 
Indigenous protests and demands for autonomy and compensa-
tion in North America would result in domestic terrorism.256 Re-
cent years have seen Canadian state agencies classifying Indig-
enous protests over lands and resources as an “extremist” threat 
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to national security and placing protestors under heightened 
surveillance.257 
Despite foregrounding such important phenomena, the alter-
native conceptualization of colonialism and settler colonialism 
proposed here cannot escape the potential exclusions and blind 
spots of these—and all other—categories. Indeed, similar exclu-
sions are inherent to all interpretive frameworks, including, in 
the present context, the category “childhood” and the method of 
analogy. Therefore, while it is crucial to problematize the con-
cepts “colonialism” and “settler colonialism,” singling them out 
would be both analytically naïve and politically questionable. 
Moreover, like other modes of control,258 (settler) colonialism of-
ten depends on denial.259 This includes its objection to being 
named for what it is: (settler) colonialism. This may partly ex-
plain the anxieties these terms evoke in debates on analogies 
between Israel/Palestine, North America, and Australia. To 
maintain as much of their critical potential as possible, all cate-
gories and analogies must be deployed provisionally, with relent-
less suspicion toward their frames and their often-invisible ex-
clusions, in order to prevent them, as much as possible, from un-
wittingly stifling critical thinking and action. 
C. The Reduction of Analogy to Similarity 
The similarity-centered framing of the colonialism analogy260 
represents a broader tendency, characteristic of public and aca-
demic debates, to assess analogies primarily on the basis of 
whether their referents evince “sufficient similarity.” This prev-
alent reduction of analogy to similarity, however, can be called 
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into question on at least three counts, each of which warrants an 
alternative discursive framework such as the one provided 
above261—an alternative framework that would evaluate analo-
gies not (only) on the complicated grounds of similarity but in 
view of what can be gained or lost by deploying them. 
First, though “analogy,” like all terms, offers itself to a variety 
of definitions (none of which is “truer” than others), believers in 
conceptual distinctions may nonetheless treat it as distinguish-
able from other, related concepts.262 In this line of thinking, if 
“equation” can be crudely defined as suggesting sameness; “com-
parison” as either pointing to or assessing similarity; and “jux-
taposition” as either highlighting contrasts or inviting compari-
son; then what may set “analogy” apart is its presumption of dif-
ference between its referents. This is the difference analogy 
seeks to transcend, but not to deny, as it discerns sameness. In 
large part, then, it is this premise of analogy—the assumption 
that the parallels in question lie in otherwise dissimilar sites—
which renders historical-geographical analogies as stimulating 
and contentious as they tend to be. Thus conceptualized, analogy 
is predicated on and designed to see beyond both difference and 
sameness: it presupposes difference, likens across this differ-
ence, but all the while acknowledges and leaves difference in 
place. 
If this conceptual distinction is adopted—provisionally and 
strategically—then in denoting both similarity and difference, 
historical-geographical analogies can be seen as potentially serv-
ing two functions at once. On the one hand, by suggesting com-
monality between seemingly unparalleled social settings,263 
counter-dominant analogies can challenge a political entity’s 
self-image—be it a sense of national exceptionalism,264 for exam-
ple, or a country’s self-affiliation with certain political configu-
rations and self-distancing from others.265 On the other hand, by 
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simultaneously acknowledging the inevitably infinite particu-
larity of each of its referents, an analogy can destabilize simplis-
tic characterizations of phenomena as either exemplary or ex-
ceptional. In this and other regards, analogical reasoning can al-
ready be specific, though it may seem to aspire to generalization. 
Moreover, in the process of designating certain themes as sim-
ilar, such analogies can also indicate their varying manifesta-
tions and uses, even where the aim is not to provide a systematic 
comparative analysis. As a case in point, the generational segre-
gation analogy established in this article can point to significant 
variations, three of which have already become evident in some 
of the above quotes. First, Israeli advocates of generational seg-
regation lack the assimilationist rhetoric of their North Ameri-
can and Australian counterparts.266 This is notwithstanding the 
fact that in some other contexts the desire for ethnic purity has 
not been exclusive to Israel/Palestine,267 and that a few excep-
tional examples of Zionist assimilationism can be found else-
where.268 Second, for the most part, Australia’s focus was on 
“breeding out the color” of mixed-race children, whereas in the 
other three countries the primary concern has generally been 
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with social rather than biological influences.269 Third, the objec-
tives of generational segregation concerning the adults from 
whom the children were removed in North America (preemptive 
counterinsurgency) were different from those in Israel/Palestine 
(legitimizing the curtailment of rights). 
The generational segregation analogy intimates a myriad of 
other differences. One of these is that the Israeli legal system, 
though preoccupied with the physical appearance of Palestinian 
child detainees in other circumstances,270 has shown none of the 
interest of either North American or Australian authorities in 
the clothing and physicality of the separated children.271 There 
is also an important disparity in the scope and length of genera-
tional segregation. Among other things, in Australia, such sepa-
ration was generally meant to be permanent, while being tem-
porary in the other countries; Australian authorities typically 
sought to prevent all contact between the segregated children 
and their families, whereas elsewhere such contact was nor-
mally allowed, albeit to considerably varying degrees;272 and the 
Palestinian children in Israeli custody are usually older, and are 
separated for shorter periods,273 than their North American—
and even more so their Australian—counterparts.274 In addition, 
in North America and Australia alike, the policies, practices, ra-
tionalizations, and scope of generational segregation varied from 
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one region or state to another and changed over time.275 The fur-
ther the generational segregation analogy is pursued, the more 
such disparities may come to the fore. 
A second challenge to the prevalent notion that “insufficiently 
similar” referents defy analogy has to do, more fundamentally, 
with the bilateral relationship between analogy and resem-
blance. Analogies do not simply identify preexisting parallels. 
Instead, they are among the conceptual frameworks that inform 
whether, and to what extent, phenomena are deemed alike in 
the first place. To become visible, legible, and meaningful, simi-
larity and dissimilarity partly depend on the analogies they are 
often assumed to precede.276 For example, by tying separation to 
incarceration and “national security,”277 the generational segre-
gation analogy does not simply capture, but may actually alter, 
the extent to which Palestinian children’s separation in Israeli 
custody is perceived as similar to that of their Indigenous coun-
terparts in North America and Australia. Accordingly, the more 
an analogy dominates a discursive field, the more it can make 
certain “parallels” or “differences” appear self-evident, while po-
tentially obscuring or discounting alternative analogies—alter-
native structurings of similitude and disparity. If violence can 
be broadly defined as the preclusion of possibilities and potenti-
alities,278 then, in these and other respects, analogy and violence 
seem inextricable from one another. Deploying an analogy, as 
well as avoiding an analogy, potentially exclude certain idea-
tional frameworks. 
Finally, another risk—which political activism runs when sim-
ilarity becomes its basis—is making commonality a prerequisite 
for compassion and action and thereby eroding interest in, or 
sympathy for, the plight of others that either seem unparalleled 
or possess less visible parallels.279 This is an ever-present ethical 
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challenge for solidarity campaigns that revolve around inter-
group resemblance, such as those analyzed in this article.280 The 
prevalent reduction of analogy to similarity thus ignores anal-
ogy’s predication on difference, overlooks analogy’s influence on 
whether its supposedly preexisting referents are deemed alike 
in the first place, and risks making similarity a prerequisite for 
solidarity. 
CONCLUSION 
This article has provided three complementary readings of the 
relationship between analogy and generational segregation, 
sharing a common substantive and methodological point of de-
parture: Palestinian prisoners’ engagement, through studies 
now prohibited by the Israeli government and courts, with anal-
ogy-based critiques and the issue of Indigenous child removal. 
First, using analogy, the article has shone a spotlight on here-
tofore unexamined parallels, connections, and continuities be-
tween the removal of Indigenous children to boarding schools in 
the United States and Canada, Australia’s Aboriginal “stolen 
generations,” and the separation of Palestinian children and 
adults in Israeli custody. Across these different contexts, gener-
ational segregation, while anchored in law and couched in a lan-
guage of benevolence and legalism, has severed these children’s 
intergenerational ties and exposed them to abuse. Its targets 
have been those on both sides of the generational divide: not only 
the children concerned, who have been deemed highly malleable 
and hence susceptible to intervention, but also their adult coun-
terparts. In North America and Australia, generational segrega-
tion was advocated as a counterinsurgency measure against In-
digenous adults, while Israeli authorities have invoked the pre-
sumed irredeemability of the separated Palestinian adults as 
grounds for retracting their entitlements (including the above 
studies). This is but part of broader connections between gener-
ational segregation, incarceration, education, and “national se-
curity.” Alongside the cross-national links generational segrega-
tion involved at the time and its lasting legacies in North Amer-
ica and Australia, this analogy thus highlights its reemergence 
in the form of analogous practices in Israel/Palestine. 
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Second, to better contextualize the analogies Palestinian pris-
oners explored and the generational segregation analogy put for-
ward here, this article has investigated the ubiquity and multi-
ple roles of related analogies in relevant discourses surrounding 
North America, Israel/Palestine, and Australia. Under examina-
tion have been analogies that, like the analogies in the course 
books to which Palestinian prisoners have been denied access, 
invoke Indigenous-settler relations. Such analogies have figured 
prominently in a range of sites spanning two centuries: from con-
temporary scholarly debates to statements, past and recent, by 
political activists, state politicians, soldiers, judges, and lawyers. 
Across this discursive tapestry, opposing sides of the debate 
have used historical-geographical analogies, occasionally using 
the very same analogy for conflicting objectives. This indicates 
that the generational segregation analogy is also inevitably open 
to competing interpretations and applications and should there-
fore be understood in a more nuanced light than might often be 
the case. 
Third, further theorizing analogy, the article has provided a 
critical analysis of three relevant framings of analogies: (a) le-
galistic criticisms of generational segregation, which portray it 
as a breach of legal norms; (b) rigid conceptualizations of coloni-
alism and settler colonialism in debates about analogies between 
North America, Australia, and Israel/Palestine; and (c) the ten-
dency—common in and beyond the present context—to equate 
analogy with similarity. Starting with legalistic criticisms, this 
article has criticized them for portraying generational segrega-
tions, such as those under examination, as exceptions to an oth-
erwise benign legal field of child law and policy, thus leaving this 
field and its norms uncontested. In so doing, this legalistic fram-
ing neglects not only the reliance of generational segregation on 
law281 but also its resonance with broader characteristics of mod-
ern child law and policy. As discussed in this article, countless 
other child-focused interventions across the world have worked 
to children’s detriment, further disempowering already disad-
vantaged groups, while also reproducing the same essentialism 
undergirding generational segregation—the conception of “chil-
dren” as a distinct and fundamentally uniform group. More spe-
cifically, North America, Australia, and Israel/Palestine, as well 
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as a host of other places, have witnessed additional generational 
segregation and attempts at mass reeducation. Moreover, in iso-
lating specific generational segregations from this global back-
drop, legalistic criticisms neglect the transnational nature of cer-
tain forms of such segregation, as well as the cross-national 
movement of related discourses and practices. 
As for debates that rigidly conceptualize “colonialism” or “set-
tler colonialism,”282 this article has called into question two such 
rigid conceptualizations in particular. The first demarcates colo-
nialism along strict historical, geographical, or political lines. 
Such conceptualization has several pitfalls: it neglects colonial-
ism’s traces outside these imagined boundaries, downplays the 
prevalence of supposedly colonial phenomena within liberal 
“normalcy,” and overlooks colonialism’s complex and ever-mu-
tating nature. The second rigid conceptualization reductively as-
sesses colonialism or settler colonialism through a checklist of 
similarities, be they similarities between different cases or be-
tween a given case and some presumed prototype. As an alter-
native to such conceptual rigidity, this article has suggested that 
a flexibly defined settler-colonial mode of operation sheds light 
on important political and legal forces that complement, paral-
lel, and inform generational segregation. Specifically, like gen-
erational segregation, such practices fragment subjugated 
groups and position them as a national security threat. 
Shifting the discussion to a wider conceptual level, this article 
has criticized the widespread tendency to equate analogy with 
similarity. This reductive framing has at least three perils: it 
neglects the possibility of seeing analogy as predicated on differ-
ence; disregards the bilateral dynamic whereby an analogy’s ref-
erents partly depend on the analogy itself to be considered alike 
in the first place; and risks making commonality a prerequisite 
for empathy and political action. 
Together, the three intertwined perspectives of this article 
bring into conversation bodies of scholarship that have so far re-
mained largely disconnected, dealing with a wide range of topics: 
the use of analogy as both an interpretive and rhetorical device, 
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in law283 and in general;284 Indigenous child removal in Aus-
tralia,285 Canada,286 the United States,287 and cross-national or 
comparative studies thereof;288 discourses and practices concern-
ing Palestinian children, and Palestinian intergenerational in-
teractions, in Israeli custody;289 the legal and social construction 
of childhood;290 and, finally, colonialism,291 particularly settler 
colonialism.292 Rather than rehashing this literature by attempt-
ing to exhaust any of these subjects separately, this article has 
placed them within a single framework in order to canvass their 
interrelationship holistically. 
This holistic analysis is of both methodological and substan-
tive consequence.293 Methodologically, it employs analogy both 
as a mode and an object of inquiry: Part I of this article used the 
method of analogy to shed new light on generational segregation, 
while Parts II and III put analogy itself on trial, examining its 
effects, potential, and pitfalls. This unique approach, or method, 
thus simultaneously brings to light and problematizes previ-
ously unexamined connections, parallels, and continuities. It 
foregrounds the political and cultural nature of analogies, and is 
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also itself, no less importantly, a statement about method: a 
statement about the need to maintain a critical distance from, 
and self-reflexivity about, one’s method, and also about how 
methods—such as analogy—are neither separate from nor ex-
ternal to their field of inquiry. 
Substantively, this framing brings to the fore two significant 
links between analogy and generational segregation. First, anal-
ogy can offer Palestinian inmates a political space unenclosed by 
the physical and temporal boundaries of Israeli prison.294 Inter-
generational knowledge transfer potentially serves a similar 
function for these Palestinians, as it has done for Indigenous 
people in North America and Australia. Israel’s restriction of 
analogy-filled studies, and its growing separation of Palestinian 
child and adult inmates, must therefore be analyzed in conjunc-
tion with one another, as two mutually complementary develop-
ments. Second, both analogy and generational segregation are 
key cornerstones of childhood. Through analogy, the category 
“childhood” has been extended well beyond those who are legally 
classified as children. Not uncommonly, women, non-white 
groups,295 the elderly,296 the Global South,297 and others who are 
formally adults but deemed short of adult faculties, have been 
infantilized—analogized to children. These analogies instigate 
and mutually rely on institutional generational segregation as 
well as spatial transgression. In modern times, those classified 
as children (and to an extent those who are considered childlike) 
have been relegated away from the “normal” adult sphere, pur-
portedly to shield them from it, or it from them. Spatial trans-
gressions, such as an unaccompanied adult in the playground or 
the joint incarceration of children and adults, are seen as both 
distressing and requiring stricter separation. Given their major 
and interrelated roles with regard to childhood, critiquing each 
of these—analogy and generational segregation—is valuable for 
thinking critically about the other, as well as about childhood. 
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This article has thus sought to harness analogy to innovatively 
investigate the ongoing history of generational segregation, 
while also maintaining a critical distance from analogy, tracing 
analogy’s political baggage and historical specters, and problem-
atizing its potential exclusions and blind spots. By shedding new 
light on generational segregation through analogy while critiqu-
ing analogies in light of discourses and practices related to such 
segregation, a central aim of this article has thus been to funda-
mentally challenge and reinvent the terms and frameworks 
available for thinking about issues at the intersection of genera-
tional segregation and historical-geographical analogies. 
